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Since the calculus of probability was axiomatized, the question of how probabilities should be interpreted has been cen-
tral to philosophy of probability. This question can be understood as follows: what do probabilities measure? According to
the propensity answer that Popper introduced in the 1950s [14,15], probabilities measure propensities that tend to produce
possible singular events. These propensities belong to the physical world, and (therefore) probabilities of singular events are
physical under the propensity interpretation. This was the main motivation for the introduction of the propensity theory,
and it remains the main appeal of the proposal. Propensities belong to the physical world, but more precisely what they
are depends on which physical conditions are the case. For example, the propensity tending to produce the occurrence of
six on next throw of a given die depends on the physical properties of the throwing device (that is, mainly the physical prop-
erties of the die itself and of the surface on which it is to be thrown). Therefore the probability of six on next throw of the die
also depends on this set of physical conditions.
The propensity theory of probability has confronted many criticisms. Among them, the most robust as well as fundamen-
tal one is undoubtedly ‘‘Humphreys’ paradox”. According to this criticism, the propensity theory may well be an interpreta-
tion of absolute probabilities, yet it cannot serve as an interpretation of conditional probabilities. In other words, there
cannot be a propensity interpretation of conditional probabilities. Two important consequences ensue. First, one has to give
up the idea of a correspondence between subjective and physical probabilities that would conform to Lewis’ Principal Prin-
ciple [7]. Indeed, rational degrees of conditional belief provably are conditional probabilities [19] and therefore the propen-
sity interpretation should work for conditional probabilities if the Principal Principle is to be retained. Second, one has to give
up the idea that probability theory as we know it is a theory of all aleatory events.
Against Humphreys, several authors have developed propensity interpretations of conditional probabilities. None of them
is commonly accepted as successfully overriding the difﬁculty but, on the other hand, it is not clear whether all currently
existing proposals fall under Humphreys’ criticism as recently restated [5]. In this context, the present paper aims both at
giving an update on Humphreys’ paradox and the debate surrounding it, and at determining whether and along which lines
it may be solved.. All rights reserved.
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probabilities are reviewed in Section 3. It is concluded that one of these suggestions may be accepted although it is hardly
intelligible. Consequently, the end of the paper is devoted to produce an interpretation that is both acceptable and undoubt-
edly intelligible. The originality and interest of the proposed interpretation lie at least as much in the reasoning leading to its
formulation as in the way it is speciﬁed precisely. To be a little bit more precise, the solution is built out of an analysis of
what it means to interpret conditional probabilities. This analysis is provided in Section 4. The proposed propensity inter-
pretation of conditional probabilities is formulated in Section 5 and it is discussed in Section 6.
2. Humphreys’ paradox
Starting in the 1980s, Humphreys’ paradox has been exposed in a variety of ways. Humphreys’ seminal paper [4]1 offers
an informal as well as a formal version of the paradox and subsequent discussions gave rise to many reformulations of the dif-
ﬁculty, in both formal and informal forms. In this opening section, I will stick to formal versions of the paradox because, as
Humphreys points out, ‘‘for those, a satisfactory solution is required” [5, p. 668]. Moreover, I will focus on ofﬁcial versions: ﬁrst
the paradox as exposed in [4] and second the generalization it is given in [5].
Both Humphreys’ original argument and its extension in [5] depend on considering a particular physical system:
A source of spontaneously emitted photons allows the particles to impinge upon the mirror, but the system is so arranged
that not all the photons emitted from the source hit the mirror. . . Let It2 be the event of a photon impinging upon the
mirror at time t2, and let Tt3 be the event of a photon being transmitted through the mirror at time t3 later than t2.
Now consider the single-case conditional propensity Prt1ðjÞ where t1 is earlier than t2 [4, p. 561].
This description implies the three following probabilistic conditions [4, p. 561]2:1 The
probabi
‘‘Hump
2 For
occurrinPrt1ðTt3jIt2Þ ¼ p > 0 ð1aÞ
1 > Prt1ðIt2jBt1Þ ¼ q > 0 ð1bÞ
Prt1ðTt3jnot  It2Þ ¼ 0: ð1cÞBesides these conditions, Humphreys claims that:Prt1ðIt2jTt3Þ ¼ Prt1ðIt2jnot  Tt3Þ ¼ Prt1ðIt2Þ: ð2Þ
Unlike (1a)–(1c), (2) does not stem from the description of the photon-emitting system. Rather, it is a substantial hypothesis
concerning the way some particular probabilities should be evaluated.
More precisely, Prt1ðIt2jTt3Þ has the peculiarity to be an inverse conditional probability, that is a conditional probability with
the conditioning event (Tt3 in the case in point) posterior to conditioned event (It2). Correlatively, it is not clear how it should
be evaluated when given a propensity interpretation. Indeed, propensities are causal entities, and therefore what they be-
come in time-reversed contexts is problematic. Humphreys’ answer concerning the evaluation of Prt1ðIt2jTt3Þ can be seen
as an instantiation of a more general principle for evaluating inverse conditional probabilities:
Principle 1 (CI) If PrðAjBÞ is an inverse conditional probability given a propensity interpretation, then PrðAjBÞ ¼
PrðAjnot  BÞ ¼ PrðAÞ.
Humphreys’ justiﬁcation for (CI) is that posterior events do not (at least normally and in the situations that he addresses and
that I also will address in the present text) inﬂuence prior events, and hence they cannot modify the propensity of the system
to produce them. In particular, ‘‘the propensity for a particle to impinge upon the mirror is unaffected by whether the par-
ticle is transmitted or not” [4, p. 561].
Humphreys’ justiﬁcation for (CI) seems to be sound, since it essentially appeals to the acknowledged causal features of
propensities. The matter is that (CI) turns out to be incompatible with usual properties of probabilities. More exactly,
Humphreys derives two contradictions. The premises of the ﬁrst one are: (1a)–(1c) and (2) and the law of total probability,
while the premises of the second one are: (1a)–(1c) and (2) and Bayes’ theorem. But both the law of total probability and
Bayes’ theorem are fundamental results concerning standard conditional probabilities. Therefore, the existence of the two
derivations just mentioned inescapably leads to conclude that the propensity theory is not an interpretation of probability
theory considered as a theory of both absolute and conditional probabilities. ‘‘Propensities cannot be probabilities” [4, p. 557]
and this is the result known as ‘‘Humphreys’ paradox”.
Since (1a)–(1c) immediately stem from the description of the photon-emitting system considered by Humphreys, the
only strategy out of the formal paradox consists in denying (2), which implies rejecting (CI). In [5], Humphreys identiﬁes
in the literature two principles that compete with (CI):paper is seminal in the sense that it has been the ﬁrst published paper Humphreys devoted to his objection against the propensity interpretation of
lity. Yet Humphreys already had the objection and the objection was already known among philosophers of science by the end of the 1970s. The name
hreys’ paradox” was introduced in [3].
reasons that should become clear later on, my notations are slightly different from Humphreys’ ones. Moreover, not  E refers to the event of E not
g.
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and:
Principle 3 (FP) If PrðAjBÞ is an inverse conditional probability given a propensity interpretation, then PrðAjBÞ ¼ 1 or 0.
Principle (ZI) is supported in particular by Fetzer in [3], as a consequence of posterior events presumably having no causal
inﬂuence on prior events. Principle (FP) is most noticeably advocated in [12] and it expresses the fact that at t3 posterior to
t2, Et2 has deﬁnitely occurred or failed to occur: the inverse conditional probability takes value 1 in the ﬁrst case and value 0
in the second one. It could be debated which one – if any – of (CI), (ZI) and (FP) is adequate in the propensity framework.
However, the debate is useless as far as Humphreys’ paradox is concerned. Indeed, it is shown in [5] that both (ZI) and
(FP) lead to formal paradoxes analogous to the one concerning (CI). More precisely, the paradox then stems from some in-
verse conditional probabilities (all of them, actually, in the case of (ZI)) being given value 0 by principle. Humphreys’ paradox
is thus generalized.
At this point, the situation may look quite desperate. Still, from what has been stated hitherto I would like to draw two
remarks that may eventually allow for some optimism. To start with, it must be emphasized that none of the proponents of
(CI), (ZI) or (FP) explicitly raises the question of how conditional probabilities should be interpreted in the propensity frame-
work. To put it differently, they implicitly agree on the idea that the propensity interpretation of absolute probabilities ana-
lytically contains an interpretation of conditional probabilities: they consider that what conditional probabilities given a
propensity interpretation measure stems from what absolute probabilities measure. But – and this is the ﬁrst of my remarks
– the very debate reveals that this assumption is false. Diverging principles for the evaluation of inverse conditional prob-
abilities indeed rely on different conceptions of the way conditional probabilities should be interpreted in the propensity
framework. More precisely, Humphreys’ (CI) cannot be separated from the idea that PrðAjBÞ measures the propensity tend-
ing to realize A in as much as it is possibly physically modiﬁed by the occurrence of B; (ZI) presupposes that PrðAjBÞ mea-
sures the causal inﬂuence of B on A; and (FP) stems from the idea that it measures the propensity tending to realize A as it
stands at the moment in time which is characteristic of B. Such a disagreement would not happen if it were true that the
propensity theory of absolute probabilities analytically contains an interpretation of conditional probabilities. As a conse-
quence, it should be considered an open question how conditional probabilities can and should be interpreted in a propen-
sity framework.
In this context, what [4,5] show is only that a certain number of answers will not do because they lead to principles for the
evaluation of inverse conditional probabilities that are incompatible with standard probability theory. Still, one must notice
that Humphreys does not give a general argument against the very idea of producing a propensity interpretation of condi-
tional probabilities. If the question of how conditional probabilities should be interpreted in a propensity framework is in-
deed open, [4,5] do not rule out the possibility of this question receiving a satisfactory answer. They do not even rule out the
possibility that the question already received a satisfactory answer. Indeed, there currently exist proposals for the propensity
interpretation of conditional probabilities that are not addressed by Humphreys – whether these proposals were formulated
posterior to [5], or Humphreys does not take them into account properly. I will now turn to these proposals, and examine
whether one of them provides a satisfactory answer to the open question of how conditional probabilities can be interpreted
in the propensity framework.3. Proposals not addressed by Humphreys
Examination of the proposals that are unaddressed in [5] aims primarily at determining whether one of them is satisfac-
tory. Consequently, it will be useful to start with some precisions as to what it is for a proposed propensity interpretation of
conditional probabilities to be satisfactory. Here, I will take it as uncontroversial that a necessary (though not sufﬁcient) con-
dition for this is that the following two criteria are met:
– Interpretation: the proposal should be an interpretation of conditional probabilities, that is it should tell us what condi-
tional probabilities measure.
– Admissibility3: the proposal should account for the standard properties of conditional probabilities.
Humphreys [5] shows that a necessary condition for a proposal to satisfy Admissibility is that it does not lead to any of prin-
ciples (CI), (ZI) or (FP) for the evaluation of inverse conditional probabilities. The proposals that are not addressed in this
paper and that must be now confronted with Interpretation and Admissibility fall out into three types: co-production pro-
posals, what I will call ‘‘ratio proposals”, and Milne’s conditional-event proposal.3 The term is introduced by Salmon as one of his criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability. See [18, pp. 63–64].
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The phrase ‘‘co-production interpretation” is introduced in [5, p. 671], where it is deﬁned as follows:
A co-production interpretation considers the conditional propensity to be located in structural conditions present at an ini-
tial time t, with PrtðjÞ being a propensity at t to produce the events which serve as the two arguments of the conditional
propensity [5, p. 671].
Co-production proposals for the propensity interpretation of conditional probability are supposedly addressed by the gen-
eralized version of Humphreys’ argument. However, it is my contention that they are not addressed properly by Humphreys.
More precisely, my claim is that [5] does not succeed in establishing that co-production interpretations of conditional prob-
abilities fail to satisfy Admissibility. I shall start here with a justiﬁcation of this claim, and go on with the examination of
whether co-production proposals indeed meet the Interpretation and Admissibility requirements.
Two major advocates of a co-production interpretation of conditional probabilities are McCurdy [8] and Miller [9,10]. For
three, non-independent, reasons, I will focus on McCurdy’s proposal. First, [8] both most directly addresses the formal ver-
sion of Humphreys’ paradox that I am interested in, and offers the most elaborate version of a co-production proposal. Sec-
ond, Humphreys’ 2004 response to co-production proposals focuses on McCurdy’s 1996 proposal. As for Miller, Humphreys
essentially refers the reader to the criticism he has just raised at McCurdy [5, p. 677]. Third, it cannot be questioned that [8] is
central in the ﬁeld of co-production positions concerning conditional propensities. In particular, Miller himself refers to [8]
as ‘‘a paper that I am largely in agreement with (though it is suggested incorrectly on p. 106 that I regard propensities as
fundamentally propensities to generate frequencies)” [10, p. 111].
According to McCurdy,
the ‘‘conditional” propensity Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ is interpreted as the propensity at t1 (for a system satisfying conditions Bt1) to
produce a photon that is transmitted at t3 conditional upon its producing a photon that impinges upon the mirror at t2.
On this account, a conditional propensity such as Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ is interpreted as the propensity at t1 for the system to
produce the event Tt3, given that the event It2 is also produced [. . .]. Furthermore, the values assigned to conditional
and inverse conditional propensities are intended to provide a measure of the strength of the propensity for the system
to produce the two future events in the manner speciﬁed [8, p. 109].
Let me ignore Bt1 for a while, and state how the conception exposed by McCurdy is meant to solve Humphreys’ paradox.
Focusing on the photon-emitting device introduced by Humphreys, the solution essentially resides in McCurdy’s claim that
his views on conditional propensities lead to the conclusion that the inverse conditional probability Prt1ðIt2jTt3Þ has value 1.
In McCurdy’s words:
the value of Prt1ðIt2jTt3Bt1Þmust be one since the description of the system indicates that the system is arranged in such a
manner that if the system produces a photon that is transmitted at t3, then the system must also produce a photon that
impinges upon the mirror at t2 [8, pp. 110–111].
This makes McCurdy’s conception immune to Humphreys’ original paradox and to its 2004 generalizations relying on some
inverse conditional probabilities taking value 0 by principle. Before I turn to Humphreys’ analysis of McCurdy’s position, let
me quote McCurdy’s further explanation of the failure of (CI) for the photon example:
the events It2; Tt3, and not  Tt3 share common causal factors that are effective between t0 [prior to t1] and t2. Speciﬁcally,
the photon transmission arrangement itself (described by Bt1) provides a host of common causal factors. This fact is
responsible for the failure of principle (CI): if the system produces event Tt3, then it must have exhibited certain causal
factors, some of which have an inﬂuence on event It2 [and this inﬂuence, it is argued, is such that It2 cannot have failed to
occur] [8, p. 116].
In [5], Humphreys claims that McCurdy’s application of his own analysis to the photon example is ﬂawed, and that co-
production proposals in fact lead to (CI). His argumentation goes along the following lines:
1. he analyzes McCurdy’s mistake in terms of the photon example ‘‘misleadingly suggesting some quasi-deterministic
aspects of the fundamentally indeterministic propensity at t1; Prt1ðIt2jBt1Þ” [5, p. 674]4;
2. he introduces an alternative example involving radioactive decay as a source of indisputable indeterminism. This new
example is analogous to the initial one, but the formal role of impingement of the emitted photon against the mirror
is now played by an episode of radioactive decay;
3. from the indisputable indeterminism of the new example, he concludes that no argument involving common causal fac-
tors is available in that case and that (CI) is ‘‘evidently true” [5, p. 675] – or, more rigorously, that it evidently applies – in
the new case;
4. from the fact that (CI) should apply in the newly introduced example, he infers that co-production proposals lead to (CI)
as a general principle for the evaluation of inverse conditional probabilities [5, Table 1, p. 677].4 For the sake of coherence, I slightly modify Humphreys’ notations.
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being adequate for the new, indisputably indeterministic, example should imply its being adequate for the old photon exam-
ple – let alone its being correct as a general principle for the evaluation of inverse conditional probabilities. In particular, he
does not explain why the difference between the ‘‘quasi-deterministic aspects” [5, p. 674] of the initial system and the ‘‘irre-
ducibly indeterministic nature” [5, p. 675] of the new one should not lead to different principles for the evaluation of inverse
conditional propensities. Second, (CI) is not given a satisfactory justiﬁcation even for the indisputably indeterministic case.
More precisely, Humphreys does not give any new positive justiﬁcation of (CI), but only argues that McCurdy’s line of rea-
soning cannot be followed concerning the new example. Moreover, his justiﬁcation for this seems to rely on the claim that
radioactive decay, being indisputably indeterministic, does not have any cause. But it is not at all clear that the considered
system cannot count as a cause of radioactive decay, very much in the same way as ‘‘the photon transmission arrangement
itself (described by Bt1) provides a host of [. . .] causal factors” [8, p. 675] for It2 and Tt3 according to McCurdy. My conclusion,
then, is that Humphreys fails to establish that co-production proposals lead to (CI). In other words, co-production proposals
are not correctly addressed in [5]. Therefore, it remains possible that co-production proposals constitute a satisfactory an-
swer to the question of how conditional probabilities should be interpreted in a propensity framework.
Let me now explain, still focusing on McCurdy’s proposal, why I think that co-production proposals do not in fact consti-
tute such a satisfactory answer. I have already quoted McCurdy’s proposal for the interpretation of conditional probabilities:
‘‘a conditional propensity such that Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ is interpreted as the propensity at t1 for the system to produce the event
Tt3, given that the event It2 is also produced” [8, p. 109]. My contention is that the conception thus deﬁned does not meet the
Interpretation criterion for a satisfactory interpretation of conditional probabilities. Use of the phrase ‘‘given that” is crucial
here: ‘‘given that” is both characteristic of conditional probability statements and notably unclear, and that it is central in
McCurdy’s proposal reveals that the proposal fails to give insight into how conditional probabilities should be understood
and in particular into what they measure.
It could be, however, that I was unfair to McCurdy and that the quotation I picked out does not do full justice to his con-
ception. To ﬁx this, let me now come to the most elaborate aspect of McCurdy’s proposal: the rule for ‘‘updating” probabil-
ities. Indeed, McCurdy devotes a long passage to explaining how probabilities given a propensity interpretation evolve in
time:
the propensities that systems possess, and the values of those propensities, also change over time. In the photon system, if
the event It2 occurs at t2, then it is possible to update the dispositional nature of that system to reﬂect the dispositional
nature of the ‘‘new” system as it exists at t2. Updating the dispositional nature of that system requires the deﬁnition of a
new propensity function for the system at t2; call this new function Prt2. This function is conditioned on a set of back-
ground conditions Bt2 which consists of the conditions expressed in Bt1 as well as the additional condition that the event
It2 occurred at t2. [. . .] The assignments made by the new propensity function are deﬁned as follows:
Prt2ðTt3jBt2Þ ¼ Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ ¼ p, and Prt2ðnot  Tt3jBt2Þ ¼ Prt1ðnot  Tt3jIt2Bt1Þ ¼ 1 p [8, p. 112].
This passage makes clear that conditioning events Bti are somehow unusual: they stand for sets of physical conditions to
which propensities are relative. To this extent, and as noticed by McCurdy [8, p. 110], probabilities with form PrtiðEtjjBtiÞ
should be considered as absolute probabilities rather than as conditional ones. Now, McCurdy claims that Btis are modiﬁed
as time passes by and (usual) conditioning events occur or fail to occur. More precisely, the modiﬁcation is such that Bt2 is
‘‘the conditions expressed in Bt1 as well as5 the additional condition that the event It2 occurred at t2”. Conditional probabilities
measure propensities relative to these updated sets of physical conditions, and the fact that it conveys this claim seems to be
how McCurdy’s proposal in meant to meet Interpretation.
Still, what, exactly, are those sets of physical conditions? In particular, how should one understand ‘‘as well as” in this
context? The notation introduced by McCurdy at the end of the passage suggests understanding it as a conjunction. This,
however, will not do: there is no straightforward sense in which a set of physical conditions and an event may be conjoined.
And even if one considers the proposition describing Bt1 and the proposition stating that It2 occurred, it is far from evident why
their conjunction should describe a new set of physical conditions and what this new set should be. In the end, McCurdy’s
proposal is at best incomplete, lacking more exactly an analysis of how propensities at t1 are related to propensities at t2
given that It2 occurs. But this, precisely, is lacking an explanation of the phrase ‘‘given that” that is central to conditional
probability statements. Therefore, the conclusion that McCurdy’s and, more generally, co-production proposals fail to meet
the Interpretation criterion cannot be escaped.
3.2. Ratio proposals
An analogous criticism can be raised at another type of proposals for the interpretation of conditional probabilities in the
propensity framework. These proposals are not addressed by Humphreys, neither in [4] nor in [5]. I call them ‘‘ratio propos-
als” because they essentially consist in coming back to the usual deﬁnition of conditional probabilities as ratios of absolute
probabilities – PðAjBÞ being equal to PðABÞ=PðBÞ for PðBÞ–0. In other words, the idea is to get an interpretation of conditional5 My emphasis.
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abilities as ratios of absolute probabilities. Two major advocates of ratio proposals are Max Albert:
the interpretation of the two conditional propensities Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ and Prt1ðIt2jTt3Bt1Þ is unproblematic. The conditional
propensity Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ ¼ def Prt1ðTt3It2jBt1Þ=Prt1ðIt2jBt1Þ, for instance, just gives the fraction of the causal pressure exerted
by Bt1 towards It2 that is also exerted towards Tt3 [1, p. 13].6
and Nuel Belnap:
Prt1ðTt3jIt2Bt1Þ should be read as the proportions of cases (histories) through Bt1 in which both Tt3 and It2 occur among all
the cases (histories, courses of events) in which It2 occurs ([2, p. 606]).7
Although the reference to histories is an essential aspect of Belnap’s paper as a whole, it is not an essential aspect of the way
he proposes to conceive of conditional probabilities and claims to solve Humphreys’ paradox. Correlatively, Belnap and Al-
bert propose the same answer to the question of how conditional probabilities should be interpreted in the propensity
framework: they are ratios of absolute probabilities each of which measures a propensity.
Ratio proposals have the important advantage of undoubtedly accounting for the standard properties of conditional prob-
abilities: because they are deﬁned out of the standard formal characterization of conditional probabilities, they meet Admis-
sibility by deﬁnition. Still, my contention is that ratio proposals do not fare better than co-production ones as far as
Interpretation is concerned. Indeed, the proposal to conceive of conditional probabilities as ratios, or ‘‘fractions”, of absolute
probabilities does not amount to more than recalling how standard conditional probabilities considered as numerical magni-
tudes relate to other numerical magnitudes. In other words, it does not amount to more than recalling how standard condi-
tional probabilities can be computed out of absolute probabilities. But it does not tell what conditional propensities are or (to
put it in a slightly different way) what conditional probabilities measure in the propensity framework. Ratio proposals, thus,
fail to meet the Interpretation criterion.
3.3. Milne’s proposal
Let me now turn to a last proposal that is not taken into account in [5]. It was formulated in [13] and consists in assuming
that conditional probabilities are probabilities of conditional events, and in extending to conditional probabilities so under-
stood the classical propensity interpretation of probabilities as measures of propensities. Conditional probabilities then mea-
sure propensities tending to produce conditional events – and the proposal does not have any problem meeting
Interpretation.
Conditional events, however, cannot be ordinary events, on pain of the kind of triviality that Lewis pointed out in [6, pp.
300–303]. In this paper, Lewis shows that, except for trivial cases, there does not exist a connective ) that would (1) have
the usual properties of conditionals and (2) be such that conditional probabilities PrðAjCÞ have the same values as absolute
probabilities PrðC ) AÞ [6, pp. 300–303].8 Accordingly, the bulk of Milne’s paper is devoted to spell out what conditional events
may be if they are to satisfy a very natural criterion for identity9 and if their probabilities are to be conditional probabilities.
Following a formal analysis, Milne identiﬁes some features of the conditional event b:a:
b:a deﬁnitely occurs when a and b both occur; b:a deﬁnitely fails to occur when a occurs and b fails to occur; b:a neither def-
initely occurs nor deﬁnitely fails to occur, when a fails to occur [13, p. 324].
Thus, it is possible for Milne’s conditional events to neither occur nor fail to occur. To this exact extent, they are not ordinary
events.
The ﬁrst worry one might have about Milne’s proposal is that it does not seem to bring with it any good reason why prob-
abilities of conditional events characterized along the suggested lines should actually be conditional probabilities. In other
words, Milne does not give any good reason why his proposal should meet Admissibility. But neither is there an obvious
reason why it should not meet it. In particular, Milne’s account leads to an apparently symmetrical treatment of inverse
and non-inverse conditional probabilities, which should not commit to any of the principles for the evaluation of inverse
conditional probabilities which are dismissed by [5]. Moreover, Milne’s proposal does not lead to any general principle
for the evaluation of inverse conditional probabilities and, hence, it cannot be a target for a further generalization of Humph-
reys’ paradox. Finally, it should be underlined that this (the absence of a good reason why Milne’s proposal should meet
Admissibility) is only as far as I understand the proposal correctly.
But precisely here lies the main difﬁculty with Milne’s proposal. More explicitly, I must admit that the passage I have just
quoted does not give me a very ﬁrm grasp on what Milne’s conditional events are. And things become even trickier when one
comes to propensities tending to produce conditional events. Indeed, these propensities cannot be propensities to make con-
ditional events occur in the same way as propensities to produce usual events are propensities to make these events occur.6 I change Albert’s notations in order to stick to the ones that I have been using hitherto. Recall that, under these notations, probabilities of the form
PrtiðEtj jBtiÞ can be considered as absolute probabilities (more on this below).
7 Same remark as previously concerning the notations.
8 More precision about Lewis’ results, and in particular about the distinction between the two results he has, is not needed here.
9 This criterion is formulated at the beginning of the paper: [13, p. 319].
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a conditional event clearly cannot be reduced to the probability of a conjonction of two usual events. Therefore, one has to
admit with Milne that:
Propensities are propensities to produce events/outcomes and in the case of conditional events we just do not seem to
have the events to produce [13, p. 327].
All this, I claim, is far from making clear and straightforward sense, and it is my contention that Milne’s proposal is not prop-
erly intelligible.
Acknowledgedly, the criticism I have just leveled at Milne’s proposal is not fatal. First, it crucially depends on both my
ability to understand Milne’s proposal and my own standards for intelligibility. Second, it must be clearly stated that Milne
successfully shows that if there are conditional events at all, then they must be understood along the lines that he draws.
However, he also acknowledges that nothing commits us to consider conditional probabilities as probabilities of conditional
events: ‘‘we don’t have to do this, nothing forces us to do this, but we can” [13, p. 319]. My point, then, is best understood as
follows: before embracing Milne’s interpretation, one should make sure that the assumption according to which conditional
probabilities are probabilities of conditional events is necessary. More precisely, one should make sure that no proposal can
be formulated that (1) fares as well as Milne’s as far as Admissibility and Interpretation are concerned and (2) is easily and
undoubtedly intelligible. This is what the rest of the paper aims at. More speciﬁcally, I will now leave out Milne’s assumption
that conditional probabilities are probabilities of conditional events and try to construct a propensity interpretation of con-
ditional probabilities having features (1) and (2). To this end, I will ﬁrst discuss the very notion of an interpretation of con-
ditional probabilities and examine how conditional probabilities can be interpreted once the assumption that conditional
probabilities are probabilities of conditional events has been left out.
4. Interpreting conditional probabilities
Let me take the following observation as a starting point: both the frequentist and the subjectivist accounts of probability
provably succeed in providing an interpretation of both absolute and conditional probabilities10, and yet none of them ap-
peals to Milne’s mysterious conditional ‘‘things” – which would be, more precisely, conditional propositions in the subjectivist
case and conditional properties in the frequentist one [13, p. 324]. This suggests we should ﬁrst examine the way subjectivists
and frequentists interpret conditional probabilities. This will enable me to draw a general analysis of what it is to interpret con-
ditional probabilities.
Under the frequentist interpretation, probabilities are relative frequencies in sequences of events.11 More precisely,
frequentists start with the idea that absolute probabilities are relative frequencies in a sequence of events. For example, the prob-
ability of six in a sequence of throws of a given die is the relative frequency, in this sequence, of those throws that give six. Now, the
conditional probability of six given12, say, even is the relative frequencyof throws that give six among those that give an even result.
Therefore, conditionalizing amounts to switching from probabilities as relative frequencies in the original sequence, to probabil-
ities as relatives frequencies in one of its subsequences. What this subsequence is depends on what one conditionalizes upon.
In the subjectivist case, absolute probabilities are interpreted as degrees of rational belief. Probability functions, then,
measure rational belief in the propositions they take as arguments. Speciﬁcally, let Pr be the function measuring individual
I’s rational belief under stock of information K – that is, when the stock of information she has at her disposal is K. This means
that, say, PrðAÞ is the degree to which I rationally believes in A under stock of information K. Now PrðAjBÞ, the subjectivist
claims, is the degree to which I rationally believes in A under stock of information K [ fBg. More generally, Prð:jBÞ is the func-
tion measuring I’s rational beliefs under information K [ fBg. Thus, conditionalizing on proposition B amounts to adding B to
I’s initial stock of information. As in the frequency case, it is switching from one probability function to another one, and the
exact nature of the switch depends on the proposition one conditionalizes upon.
The frequentist and subjectivist pictures corroborate one conclusion that was already drawn from the consideration of the
propensity theory alone: interpretations of conditional probabilities are not analytically contained in interpretations of abso-
lute probabilities. To put it in a slightly different way: conditionalization has to be interpreted. Moreover, the frequentist and
subjectivist pictures suggest that interpreting conditionalization can be viewed as explicating how probability functions are
modiﬁed by what one conditionalizes upon.
Examination of the frequentist and subjectivist accounts in fact enables to go further in the analysis of what it is to
conditionalize and, therefore, to interpret conditionalization. Indeed, it is clear from the presentation given above that the
frequentist interpretation makes probability functions dependent on sequences of events, whereas the subjectivist interpre-
tation makes them dependent on individuals together with the stock of information they have. Sequences of events on the
one hand and individuals endowed with stocks of information on the other hand determine probability functions.10 In the case of the frequentist theory, the result is immediate. In the case of the subjectivist theory, it is established in [17] for the absolute case and in [19]
for the conditional one.
11 Whether these sequences are ﬁnite or inﬁnite and actual or hypothetical does not matter here. Therefore, I will not take these distinctions into account, and
I will discuss frequentist interpretations in general.
12 This (‘‘given”) is the reading I will stick to for the conditionalization bar. This reading is debatable, but the point I want to make is indifferent to what the
outcome of the debate would be.
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probability functions – which are properties in the frequentist case and propositions in the subjectivist one. Correlatively,
I suggest that they be noted subscript to the Pr probability symbol, while arguments appear inside the brackets that follow
it. For instance, PrDðAÞ will be the image of argument A for the probability function whose determinant is D.
Under the distinction between determinants and arguments of probability functions, the idea according to which inter-
preting conditionalization is telling how probability functions are modiﬁed by what one conditionalizes upon can be reﬁned.
More explicitly, one is led to conceive of an interpretation of conditionalization as an explication of how the determinant of a
probability function is modiﬁed by one of its arguments. Rigorously, the idea is that conditionalization should be interpreted
as a function that associates a new determinant to each pair composed of an initial determinant and an argument.13 Let us
put this suggestion formally, beginning with the frequentist case. To that effect, let S be the set of sequences of events and P the
set of properties that the events in these sequences may satisfy. Using these notations, the frequency interpretation of condi-
tionalization can be represented as follows:13 Or,
determ
considecf : S P! S
ðS; PÞ# S0with S0 the sequence that you get when retaining from S only the events that have property P. Coming now to the subjectivist
case, it has been claimed that a probability function is determined by an individual together with a stock of information, or
(equivalently) by a couple composed of one individual and of the set of propositions he knows of. Letting I be the set of indi-
viduals, Po the set of propositions, and K the powerset of Po, this amounts to the claim that determinants of probability func-
tions are elements of I K. I have also claimed that, in the subjectivist context, conditionalization amounts to adding the
conditioning proposition to the stock of information held by the individual under consideration. Using the notations I have
just introduced, this leads to consider that the subjectivist interpretation of conditionalization is by the following function cs:cs : ðI KÞ  Po! I K
ððI;KÞ; PÞ# ðI;K 0Þ ¼ ðI;K [ fPgÞ:Having abandoned Milne’s assumption that conditional probabilities are probabilities of conditional ‘‘things” and exam-
ined the frequentist and subjectivist accounts, I now come to support the following view: what one has to interpret is con-
ditionalization (rather than conditional probabilities) and it has to be interpreted as a function associating a new
determinant for a probability function, to an initial determinant together with an argument. This leads to the wider view
of an interpretation of probability as consisting of:
1. an interpretation of absolute probabilities. This must specify in particular:
(a) what kind of objects arguments of probability functions are;
(b) what kind of objects determinants of probability functions are;2. an interpretation of conditionalization as a function from the cartesian product of the set of arguments and the set of
determinants, to the set of determinants.
Armed with this conception, I now come back to the propensity theory of probability. More precisely, I will try to follow the
lines that I have just drawn in order to construct a propensity interpretation of conditional probabilities.
5. Proposal for a propensity interpretation of conditionalization
Under the propensity theory as it was presented at the beginning of the paper:
1. absolute probabilities measure propensities of sets of physical conditions to produce singular events. Hence,
(a) arguments of probability functions are elements of the set E of singular events;
(b) determinants of probability functions are elements of the set PC of sets of physical conditions.
Consequently,
2. an interpretation of conditionalization is a function cp from the cartesian product PC E, into PC.
To begin with, note that the ﬁrst part of this account throws light on the status of the Btis that appeared above in the dis-
cussion. More precisely, it throws light on the way Btis differ from other conditioning events, and on McCurdy’s mysterious
claim that PrtiðEtjjBtiÞ probabilities should be considered as absolute rather than as conditional [8, p. 110]. Indeed, it is now
clear that Btis are determinants rather than arguments of probability functions interpreted along propensity lines.
More important, the second part of the proposed account amounts to restating the question of providing a propensity
interpretation of conditional probabilities as the question of deﬁning cp. The task I aim to perform is more exactly as follows:
deﬁning cp in such a way as to satisfy the criteria set out at the beginning of Section 3 and without appealing to Milne’smore exactly: to each pair composed of an initial determinant and an argument having an absolute probability different from 0 relative to that
inant. This point, however, is not tackled in the present paper and is left for future examination. Only pairs having the aforementioned property are
red in the rest of the paper (without it being speciﬁed each time).
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PC, I shall consider the following property of Bayesian conditionalization: for any probability function Pr and any E such that
PrðEÞ–0; PrðEjEÞ ¼ 1, and use it as a constraint on cp. Speciﬁcally, cp must have the following property:
Property 1. For any set of physical conditions PC and any singular event E such the PrPCðEÞ–0; PrcpðPC;EÞðEÞ ¼ 1.
In the end of the current section, I will ﬁrst envisage two straightforward ideas for deﬁning cp in such a way as Property 1 is
satisﬁed and explain why these ideas cannot be endorsed. Elaborating on this discussion, my own proposal will ﬁnally be
stated.
Let me ﬁrst assume that a set PC of physical conditions can be considered as a pair composed of a physical system S and a
moment t in time. Under this assumption, a ﬁrst straightforward idea is to interpret conditionalization as a ‘‘temporal jump”
from the initial moment t to a moment t0 when the probability of the conditioning event – say, E – in S is 1. In other words,
the idea is to have cpððS; tÞ; EÞ ¼ ðS; t0Þ with t0 such that PrðS;t0 ÞðEÞ ¼ 1. Property 1, then, is clearly satisﬁed. However, a suitable
t0 may fail to exist: there may very well be systems S and events E such that the probability of E never equals 1 in S. As a
consequence, cp cannot modify only the temporal component of the pairs to which it applies: it has to change systems too.
A simple such change would be from an initial system to the system the most similar to it among those in which the con-
ditioning event occurs. This proposal does not encounter the same difﬁculty as the previous one. Indeed, by deﬁnition of the
proposal, E occurs in S0 that is the ﬁrst component of cpððS; tÞ; EÞ. Therefore there exists t0 such that the probability of E at t0 in
S0 is 1. Correlatively, one can complete the deﬁnition of cp in such a way as to obtain a general proposal for which Property 1
is satisﬁed. There are two reasons why this proposal is appealing. First, it allows an analogy between the propensity theory
on the one hand, and the frequentist and subjectivist interpretations of probability on the other. In the same way as frequ-
entist conditionalization consists in taking into account only those events that instantiate the conditioning property, and in
the same way as subjectivist conditionalization consists in learning the proposition according to which a given event oc-
curred, conditionalization under the propensity view would consist in moving to a system in which the conditioning event
occurs. Second, the proposed cp is economical in the sense that the change it makes in systems is as small as compatible with
the feature here central: occurrence of the conditioning event.
Still, there is also a sense in which the proposal is not economical: it implies, for Property 1 to be satisﬁed, that condition-
alization modiﬁes both the system and the moment in time that one considers. Indeed, given that E occurs in S0, it is not the
case in general that its probability is 1 at the initial time t. Or, at least, it is not the case in general in the indeterministic
contexts that the propensity interpretation precisely is meant to deal with. Furthermore, in these contexts, it is not the case
in general that ‘‘the system which is the more similar to S among those in which E occurs” has a referent at moments pre-
ceding the moment when E actually occurs. A consequence is that the proposal under examination cannot be completed in
such a way that cpððS; tÞÞ is deﬁned at t. This, I think is not acceptable: it seems a fair requirement that an interpretation of
conditionalization be such that how a given conditional probability is interpreted is deﬁned by the time the conditional
probability itself is.
Following the above discussions, I suggest deﬁning cp as:cp : PC E! PC
ððS; tÞ; EÞ# ðSE; tÞwith SE the system that is the most similar to S among those giving probability 1 to E at t. In words, the proposal is to inter-
pret conditionalization as the function that makes to systems the slightest difference compatible with the conditioning event
having probability 1 at the moment initially under consideration. Conditionalization, then, is interpreted as the change in
systems that is minimal among those compatible with a certain way of satisfying Property 1 (namely by considering a sys-
tem that gives probability 1 to the conditioning event at the initial moment). The proposed interpretation, thus, is econom-
ical in the same way as the interpretation discussed in the previous paragraph. Moreover, it is such that the way a
conditional probability should be interpreted is completely deﬁned by the time the conditional probability itself is. This
makes my suggestion immune to any of the difﬁculties that led me to reject the two more straightforward proposals that
were discussed. Positively, the proposal has the property of being economical in the sense that the proposal discussed in
the previous paragraph was not: under my proposal, conditionalization modiﬁes only systems, not moments in time. All
in all, the proposed interpretation has important prima-facie appeal. Still, it should be more closely discussed whether it
can be accepted as an interpretation of conditional probabilities. Next section is devoted to this discussion.6. Discussion
Two kinds of things have to be discussed here: whether the proposed interpretation meets Interpretation and Admissi-
bility and whether it is immune to speciﬁc difﬁculties turning out to be diriment. These two questions are tackled in Sub-
sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Concerning more precisely Admissibility, what I have to say is not conclusive: I give
reasons to believe that the proposed interpretation satisﬁes Admissibility, but I do not properly show that it does satisfy
it. This explains why it has been possible for David Miller to come with an argument to the effect that the proposed inter-
pretation does not satisfy Admissibility. Miller’s objection and the answer he himself suggested are presented in Subsection
6.3.
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Let me discuss ﬁrst whether the interpretation I propose meets the Interpretation criterion. Here, a comparison with co-
production proposals is in order. Indeed, following [5], I took as characteristic of these proposals the fact that, both for the
sake of interpreting absolute probabilities and of interpreting conditional probabilities, they locate propensities in the phys-
ical conditions at the time initially considered. Under this characterization, my proposal can be considered a co-production
proposal. But I argued earlier that co-production proposals fail with regard to Interpretation. Let me, therefore, be a little bit
more precise and insist on my argument having more precisely been that co-production proposals as they ﬁnd their best
elaboration in [8] lack a proper account of how an initial set of physical conditions and a conditioning event together deﬁne
a new set of physical conditions. Now, such an account is exactly what my proposal provides, following the analysis de-
scribed in Section 4. Consequently, although the propensity interpretation for conditional probabilities that is proposed here
can rightfully be considered a co-production proposal, it differs from previous co-production proposals to exactly the extent
that it meets Interpretation.
Coming now to Admissibility, let me ﬁrst reiterate that I cannot offer a conclusive reason why the proposed interpretation
meets it. Still, before Miller formulated his objection, it also seemed to me that, as with Milne’s proposal, there was no good
reason why it should fail to meet it. Moreover, I identiﬁed several reasons to believe that it maymeet Admissibility and could
be therefore accepted. These reasons are stated in the end of current subsection, whereas Miller’s analysis is presented in
Subsection 6.3.
To begin with, it should be noticed that the proposed interpretation shares with Milne’s the property of apparently not
leading to any general principle for evaluating inverse conditional probabilities. If it indeed does not, then it is immune to
any further generalization of Humphreys’ paradox in its formal version. Moreover, and now slightly departing from Milne’s
proposal, the interpretation I propose was constructed so as to satisfy Property 1. Since the emphasis I put on Property 1 was
exclusive of taking into account the other (numerous) properties of Bayesian conditionalization, the fact that my proposal
was designed (only) to satisfy Property 1 could be taken as indicating that there is no good reason why this proposal should
satisfy Admissibility. However, it must be noticed that Property 1 is fundamental to Bayesian conditionalization [6, p. 311].
Correlatively, my proposal being constructed in order to satisfy Property 1 may not be considered merely as a symptom of
the absence of a conclusive reason why it should satisfy Admissibility. It may be seen also as a point in favor of the proposal
actually satisfying Admissibility – and as a point contributing to distinguish my proposal from Milne’s.
To conclude this initial discussion concerning Admissibility, let me put forward a comparative argument. Here the com-
parison will not be with alternative interpretations of probability, but with the propensity interpretation of absolute prob-
abilities. Indeed, there does not exist any conclusive argument to the effect that the propensity interpretation of absolute
probabilities is admissible – let alone a procedure for measuring propensities. As a consequence, it has to be postulated that
it is. Now, one may have an analogous postulate in the conditional case. In other words, until proved that the proposed inter-
pretation fails to account for the properties of Bayesian conditionalization, merely postulating that it does is a strategy that is
available for a proponent of the propensity interpretation of absolute probabilities.
Even one who refuses this postulating strategy should at this point be convinced that my proposal fares at least as well as
(and probably better than) Milne’s with regard to the Interpretation and Admissibility criteria. On the other hand, I take it
that my proposal is indisputably intelligible. Thus, the only reason I can now see for rejecting this proposal and sticking to
Milne’s one would be that it faces diriment speciﬁc difﬁculties. I now discuss what I take to be the most serious candidates
here.
6.2. Diriment speciﬁc difﬁculties?
I will discuss three speciﬁc reasons that might lead to reject the interpretation I have proposed for conditional probabil-
ities. The ﬁrst one is that the proposal appeals to the notion of similarity between physical systems. This seems problematic
for both conceptual and consequent epistemic reasons. More precisely, at ﬁrst sight it is clear neither whether this notion can
be given a precise meaning and what such a precise meaning could be, nor how one is to identify the system the most similar
to a given one among those that belong to a certain class. As an answer to this double objection, I will essentially argue that it
is at least seriously weakened by widening the theoretical view. More explicitly, the commonest approach to counterfactual
conditionals is through the notion of similarity between possible worlds, and I take this to make two (non independent)
points in favor of similarity between physical systems. First, similarity between physical systems looks much less problem-
atic than similarity between possible worlds. More precisely, similarity between physical systems signiﬁcantly differs from
similarity between possible worlds in that giving the ﬁrst one a precise deﬁnition does not seem to be precluded by the nat-
ure and ontological status of the relata. Positively, Paul Humphreys suggested that the notion of state phase may be given a
central place in the deﬁnition of similarity between physical systems, and David Miller proposed considering that the smaller
the amount of energy needed to turn one physical system into another one, the more similar these systems are. Whether or
not these ideas may be accepted, it is at least clear that, contrary to similarity between possible worlds, similarity between
physical systems may receive a precise, physical deﬁnition. Correlatively, accepting similarity between systems is no great
deal for one who has accepted similarity between possible worlds and, reciprocally, rejecting similarity between systems
commits to reject similarity between possible worlds. As a consequence, it commits to reject our commonest and probably
best analysis of counterfactuals – and along with it an important tool for the analysis of causality. All in all, it seems to me
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conditionalization.
The second worry that one might have concerning this interpretation is that it seems to imply that, given a time t, a sys-
tem S and an event E that ðS; tÞ can produce, there always exists SE that is similar to S and such that PrðSE ;tÞðEÞ ¼ 1. In other
words, the proposal apparently implies the existence of a slight modiﬁcation of S that is sufﬁcient to give E probability 1 at
considered time t. However seriously this worry should be taken in the indeterministic contexts at which propensities are
directed, it can be properly answered in the framework proposed here. Indeed, in this framework, similarity is not taken as a
categorical (yes/no) concept, but rather as a gradual one. More explicitly, the idea is not to pick up a (or the) system similar to
a given system, but the system the most similar to it among those having a given property. This system, however, does not
need to be (categorically) similar to the initial one. As a consequence, the proposed interpretation does not in fact have the
unpleasant implication that I presented at the beginning of the paragraph.
A third difﬁculty for the proposed interpretation has to do with the status of events. Under the propensity account, argu-
ments of probability functions, and hence in particular conditioning events, are singular events. Now, the concept of a sin-
gular event is a ﬁne-grained one, generally construed in such a way that the identity of a singular event is sensitive in
particular to the circumstances under which the event is produced. This is the case in particular under the classic Quinean
characterization of events as contents of portions of space–time [16, p. 311]. Under such a characterization, moving from the
initial system S to SE (as is required by the proposed interpretation of conditionalization) is not compatible with the initial
conditioning event E being identical to the event having probability 1 relative to ðSE; tÞ. But this means that Property 1 of
Bayesian conditionalization is not in fact properly accounted for: this property requires that the probability of E conditional
on itself is 1. My answer to this objection is as follows: the propensity account of probability does not commit to a notion of
singular event under which identity of singular events is sensitive to the circumstances under which they are produced. To
make it clear, let me come back to what I consider as essential to the propensity theory – and which Miller calls the ‘‘crucial
move” [11, p. 5] away from frequentism: the idea that propensities are dispositions exercised in every single case, rather
than dispositions to produce relative frequencies. In other terms (but still following [11]), the notion that is central here
is that of a ‘‘propensity of the arrangement at a single time to do something in a single case” [11, p. 8]. Now, this does
not imply that the ‘‘thing” the arrangement has a propensity to do is deﬁned beforehand – that is, before it actually occurs
(if it does) – in such a way that its identity is sensitive to any modiﬁcation in the conditions of its possible production.
Attaching probabilities to singular instances does not commit to any speciﬁc deﬁnition of singular events. In particular, it
is perfectly compatible with the deﬁnition of a singular event in the rather coarse-grained terms of an individual instanti-
ating a given property within the limits of a given period of time. Such a conception is in fact endorsed by both Humphreys
and his disputants, as shown by the notations they adopt. Moreover, I would claim that a rather coarse-grained notion of
singular event is not only allowed by the propensity theory as it ‘‘ofﬁcially” stands, but also required for the very notion
of probability of a singular event to make interesting sense. On the one hand, I cannot really see how the probability of a
very ﬁne-grained singular event could be different from 0 before the time it actually occurs. On the other hand, attributing
a probability to such an event has neither practical nor theoretical interest. We are interested in whether an individual
instantiates a given property in a given period of time, but not in the exact and exhaustive circumstances of this instantia-
tion. As a consequence, I will consider that the objection discussed in the present paragraph is irrelevant, and does not con-
stitute a diriment speciﬁc difﬁculty for the interpretation of conditionalization that was proposed at the end of Section 5.
6.3. Miller’s objection and his answer to it
In the two previous subsections, I have explained why the proposed interpretation of conditionalization satisﬁes Inter-
pretation, I have given reasons that had led me to believe that it does not fail to meet Admissibility and I have discarded
as not diriment the difﬁculties that the interpretation speciﬁcally raises. As already stated, my reasons to believe that the
proposed interpretation does not fail to meet Admissibility are no conclusive proof of the fact that it actually does meet
it. In accordance with this, David Miller proposed an argument to the effect that the interpretation in fact fails to meet
the criterion.14
Miller’s argument focuses on the law of total probability, and aims at showing that the interpretation I proposed cannot
account for this law being a true statement concerning conditional probabilities. More exactly, Miller shows that my pro-
posal accounting for this would have implausible consequences.
Let us indeed consider the law of total probability:
Theorem 1 (Law of total probability). For any probability function P, any A, and any E such that PðEÞ–0 and
Pðnot  EÞ–0; PðAÞ ¼ PðAjEÞ  PðEÞ þ PðAjnot  EÞ  Pðnot  EÞ.
Following my claim that probability functions given a propensity interpretation are determined by sets of physical condi-
tions, consider the function PrPC that is determined by the set PC ¼ ðS; tÞ. Theorem 1 implies that:
For any events A and E such that PrPCðEÞ–0 and PrPCðnot  EÞ–0; PrPCðAÞ ¼ PrPCðAjEÞ  PrPCðEÞ þ PrPCðAjnot  EÞ PrPCðnot  EÞ.14 This argument and the answer to the objection it constitutes were proposed on the occasion of a workshop in Paris in June 2008. It is with David Miller’s full
agreement that I here give an account of his insightful comments on my work.
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As noticed by Miller, the ﬁrst, third and ﬁfth terms of this equality have their values ﬁxed by PC. Thus, the equality implies
that, given PC, there is an algebraic relationship between the second and fourth terms – that is PrcpðPC;EÞðAÞ and PrcpðPC;notEÞðAÞ.
Under the interpretation proposed in Section 5, cpðPC; EÞ is ðSE; tÞ with SE the system the most similar to S among those that
give probability 1 to E at t, and cpðPC;not  EÞ is ðSnotE; tÞ with SnotE the system the most similar to S among those that give
probability 1 to not  E at t. Hence, under the proposed interpretation of conditionalization, the law of total probability im-
plies the following: given PC ¼ ðS; tÞ, at t the values of the probabilities in the system the most similar to S among those that
give probability 1 to E give (and are given by) those of the probabilities in the system the most similar to S among those that
give probability 0 to E. Miller claims that ‘‘such a pre-established harmony [. . .] would be remarkable” and, to be more ex-
plicit, that it is indeed very implausible.
Rather welcome is the ‘‘unsophisticated” example designed by Miller to illustrate his claim. Consider the system S con-
stituted by a plane driven by an agent furnished with a parachute and the environment the plane evolves in. At t, the plane is
in difﬁculty and the agent is dithering about jumping. More precisely, the propensity for him to ﬁnd himself in the air out of
the plane within the 5 minutes following t (an event that will be labeled E) has the same value as the propensity for him to
stay inside the plane: PrðS;tÞðEÞ ¼ PrðS;tÞðnot  EÞ ¼ 1=2. Moreover, the propensity for the agent surviving the next 10 min
(event A) is also 1/2; PrðS;tÞðAÞ ¼ 1=2. Therefore, following the previous paragraph, the law of total probability implies that1=2 ¼ PrcpððS;tÞ;EÞðAÞ  1=2þ PrcpððS;tÞ;notEÞðAÞ  1=2;
which is equivalent to:1 ¼ PrcpððS;tÞ;EÞðAÞ þ PrcpððS;tÞ;notEÞðAÞ:
In words, the propensity tending to produce A that is determined by cpððS; tÞ; EÞ and the propensity tending to produce A that
is determined by cpððS; tÞ;not  EÞ have complementary values. Now, one can suppose with Miller:
 that SE that is the most similar to S among those that give probability 1 to E at t consists of the same plane, driven by the
same agent furnished with the same parachute, evolving in the same environment, but equipped with a device that
pushes the agent out of the plane at a time shortly posterior to t,
 that SnotE consists of the same plane, driven by the same agent furnished with the same parachute, evolving in the same
environment, but equipped with a device designed to sharply knock the agent on the head at a time shortly posterior to t.
Then, that the propensity tending to produce A that is determined by cpððS; tÞ; EÞ and the propensity tending to produce A
determined by cpððS; tÞ;not  EÞ have complementary values exactly means the following: at t, the more probable it is that
the agent survives the next 10 min if he is pushed out of the plane shortly after t, the less likely it is that he survives the next
10 min if he is sharply knocked on the head shortly after t. According to Miller, and I follow him in this respect, there is no
reason why this should be so. Quite the opposite, it is plausible that, both relative to ðSE; tÞ and relative to ðSnotE; tÞ, the pro-
pensity for the agent surviving the next 10 min has a value smaller than the one it had relative to ðS; tÞ. More generally, the
proposed interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization implies that there exists a certain relationship between (values of)
propensities determined by different physical systems, such a relationship has a metaphysical content, but there does not
seem to be a metaphysical reason for it.
If Miller is right – which I suspect he is – the propensity interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization that is built up in
Section 5 fails to satisfy Admissibility and, therefore, it cannot be accepted. Fortunately, Miller had the good taste to come
not only with a strong objection to my proposal, but also with an adaptation of this proposal that overcomes the objection.
The adaptation suggested by Miller is as follows: deﬁne SE not as the system the most similar to S among those that give E
probability 1 at t, but as the system the most similar to S among those which, at t, give any A the probability
PrðS;tÞðAEÞ=PrðS;tÞðEÞ. As noticed by Miller, it is obvious that for any E such that PrðS;tÞ–0, PrðS;tÞðEjEÞ ¼ 1. In other words, Property
1 is satisﬁed by the proposal as adapted by Miller. Moreover, the interpretation thus adapted indeed overcomes the difﬁculty
identiﬁed by Miller. Indeed, by deﬁnition of this interpretation,PrPCðAÞ ¼ PrcpðPC;EÞðAÞ  PrPCðEÞ þ PrcpðPC;notEÞðAÞ  PrPCðnot  EÞis equivalent to:PrPCðAÞ ¼ PrPCðA  EÞ þ PrPCðA  not  EÞ :
the consequence of the law of total probability that was shown to be problematic under my proposal now reduces to ‘‘an
innocuous consequence of the addition law”. More generally, the interpretation suggested by Miller is constructed so as
to account for all the properties of conditional probabilities standardly deﬁned as ratios of absolute probabilities: Admissi-
bility is satisﬁed by construction. This may not be satisfactory: one may expect an interpretation not to be constructed to be
admissible, but rather to be formulated in terms different from the ones appearing in the deﬁnition of the notion to be inter-
preted and that turn out to guarantee Admissibility. Still, I currently cannot see any more satisfactory way to avoid the dif-
I. Drouet / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 153–165 165ﬁculty highlighted by Miller. Moreover, the interpretation suggested by Miller belongs to the same vein as the one that was
formulated in Section 5. It shares its advantages, in particular the ones it has over the conditional-event interpretation sup-
ported by Milne. All in all, my contention is that, for the time being, the interpretation deﬁned by Miller is our best proposal
for a propensity interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization.
7. Conclusion
I have given an update on Humphreys’ paradox and on the possibility to give a propensity interpretation of conditional
probabilities. More precisely, I have shown that, among existing proposals, only Milne’s may be accepted. Yet this proposal
suffers from its resorting to the hardly intelligible notion of conditional event. Therefore I have tried to construct a propen-
sity interpretation of conditional probabilities that does not resort to this notion and, correlatively, does not suffer from the
same intelligibility problem as Milne’s proposal. This was done after I came to the view that an interpretation of condition-
alization is a function describing the way conditioning events redeﬁne determinants of probability functions.
The interpretation I formulated was criticized by David Miller. I think his criticism is right and I subscribe to his sugges-
tion for subsequently adapting the interpretation I formulated. The adapted interpretation may still fail to be satisfactory. On
the one hand, it may be considered problematic that it satisﬁes Admissibility by construction. On the other hand, it faces the
same speciﬁc difﬁculties as the proposal I formulated in Section 5, and some of the arguments that were given in Subsection
6.2 in order to show that these difﬁculties are not diriment are acknowledgedly somehow weak. However, I do not see the
content of the proposed interpretation as the most interesting aspect of the present paper, and not even as the most impor-
tant aspect of its second, constructive part. Positively, the core claim of this constructive part is that one who renounces Mil-
ne’s conditional events is left with the task of interpreting conditionalization. In other words, contra the widespread idea that
an interpretation of conditional probabilities is analytically contained in the propensity interpretation of absolute probabil-
ities, I have shown that conditionalization requires its own interpretation and I have given an analysis of what such an inter-
pretation is formally. Specifying the interpretation, then, is only the last job. The way I have carried it out turned out to be
unsatisfactory. Maybe the way Miller suggested to carry it out can be improved. In any case, I have shown that there can be a
satisfactory propensity interpretation of conditional probabilities that does not resort to Milne’s conditional events and I
have indicated the lines along which such an interpretation should be constructed.
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